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1 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:			
	Executive	Secretary,	PFIAB

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SUBJECT

: DCI "Handouts" for PFIAB Members

Enclosed are 13 copies each of the following materials, which Mr. Colby desizes to have made available to each member of the PFIAB in connection with its discussion today of human sources intelligence.

- a. DCI Perspectives for Intelligence, 1975-1980 (Secret) copies 30, 32-43.
- b. Mr. Colby's statement and supplementary statement, before the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, 1 August 1974, on H.R. 12004, which would replace with a statutory classification system the existing system established by Executive Order 11652.
- c. Mr. Colby's statement of 22 July 1974 to Congressman Nedzi's Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, House Armed Services Committee, on H. R. 15845, which would amend the CIA charter in the National Security Act of 1947.
- d. Director, DIA, letter of 6 July 1974 to the D/DCI/IC on Defense Attache operations and attached "Examples of Attache Reporting. 11

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Coordination	Staff

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Approved For Release 2004/03/23: CIA-RDP80M01082A000900190003-4 UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD HUMAN SOURCES COMMITTEE

MAIN SOURCES COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

12 July 1974

NOTE TO: The Director

Mr. Colby:

Attached is a <u>draft</u> of a talking paper for the 1 August PFIAB meeting. It covers Phase I of a proposed course of action which would be responsive to a number of the non-operational PFIAB recommendations - principally those which bear on what they call the need for a "national focus" of human source collection.

If you have no major problems with the thrust of the draft, I will clean it up a bit and have it in your PFIAB book which will be putting together.

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DRAFT

12 July 1974

PFIAB TALKING PAPER

HUMAN SOURCE COLLECTION

- The findings of your March 1973 report concerning the national focus of human source collection states that:

"human source intelligence is a national endeavor and not merely a collection of autonomous efforts."

- You stated that:
 - "--systematizing, amalgamating and optimizing these efforts is a national problem and not a problem to be solved individually by several agencies--."
- In this regard you called for an improved national focus through steps to be taken whereby I can maintain "a regular overview of resources, requirements, and responsiveness". You also urged me to probe for ways and means of exploiting and improving the collective efforts of the Government in human source collection.

- The problems of requirements and responsiveness stem in large part from deficiencies in the adequacy of substantive communication between production analysts and the human source collectors.
 - Analysts complain that:
 - and reporting capabilities of State, Defense and CIA they cannot sort out from among these entites who-can-do-what-best and provide each with tailored guidance.
 - the responsiveness of collectors seems to be little affected despite analyst efforts at requirements and evaluations so why bother.
 - Collectors in turn complain that analysts tend to communicate to them a combination of:
 - highly general unfocused statements of need which belabor the obvious

- .. a profusion of encyclopedic guides, manuals, lists
 and detailed questions formulated without a realistic
 understanding of current reporting capabilities or even the
 likelihood of human sources being able to answer
 the questions.
- .. no feed-back on the relevance of their reporting to the key substantive issues of current concern to the Washington community.
- There are, however, instances when communication is good and the substantive guidance system works well, such as:
 - happenstance, establish sensible communication and it develops that one has a clear and specific need and the other has an existing capability to provide information that is directly relevant. The analyst and collector can now play the question-answer and further-question game.
- This me and that in instances where the area of source knowledgeability can be reasonably well defined to the analyst. he can and will respond with clear and concise guidance tailored to optimize exploitation of the source or source material available to the collector.

- . Instances such as these do not happen often enough to be effective throughout the human source community.

 But I realize that it is not realistic to try to have each of the State, DOD and CIA collection managers join an institutionalized community-wide system of "source notifications" against which all community analysts write tailored guidance.
- To develop a foundation for my overview of requirements and responsiveness, and as a means of improving substantive communication between analyst and collector, I intend to begin with systematic assessments of the collective reporting on the host country from our principal U.S. foreign posts.
- These assessments will serve several purposes, the first of which is to form the basis for communicating to analysts fairly precise profiles of substantive areas of source knowledgeabilities on the host country (or reporting strengths at each post, not only that of State but also that of Defense and CIA.

- . Armed with this insight into the most valuable collection capabilities (or reporting strengths) of the several collection entities at the post, the analyst can be motivated to tailor and communicate highly relevant substantive guidance via each collector's own command channel.
- Such guidance should serve to maximize exploitation of the identified reporting strengths.
- These assessments will also serve to identify collection and reporting deficiencies at the post, such as:
- · 'a void in post reporting coverage of host country

 affairs of current concern to U.S. national intelligence consumers;
- reporting, which is of marginal value to the community's national intelligence production process;
- reporting of information on host country affairs
 which is readily available in Washington through
 the press, broadcasts or similar media;
- failure to optimize a valuable collection capability
 despite improved and tailored substantive guidance;
- . Clandestine Service reporting on host country affairs which logically should be covered by overt reporters at the post.

- On the basis of the overall findings of these assessments I shall be able to communicate to both ambassadors and respective collection managers my guidance on the most effective distribution of tasks among various post resources having responsibilities for the reporting of information useful to U.S. intelligence.
- Ultimately, as I am able to employ these post reporting resources as "a cohesive national asset," I will be able to:
 - optimize the interrelationship between overt and clandestine collection on important national requirements on selected host countries; and
 - . clearly set forth those topics on which:
 - the host country can satisfy a large part of the national requirements but on which some clandestine collection is required to gain additional perspective or balanced views not available through State and DOD reporting by itself;

- overt reporting can provide all of the information needed to maintain base line surveillance of affairs in the host country, thereby conserving the CIA assets at the post for use against the hard targets (e.g., USSR and PRC).
- One of the key points in my 1975 Objectives, which I recently transmitted to the President, was the creation of the the new Human Sources Committee of USIB and a task to improve substantive communication between intelligence producers and human source collectors.

(continued on next page)

- In this regard I am now specifically tasking the Chairman of this Committee, in a Letter of Instruction, to take the steps necessary:
 - systematic community-wide assessment of the reporting from selected major posts in terms of its responsiveness on host country affairs of concern to consumers of the U.S. national intelligence product; and,
 - .. to use these assessments to improve substantive

 communications and thereby optimize both the reporting capabilities and potential of the post.
- Over the past several years, several somewhat-related actions have been undertaken, such as when the CIA and State analytical components assessed the adequacy of Foreign Service Officer reporting from various posts in support of the Department's own Inspector General surveys. These have been useful for a limited specific purpose.
- What I am proposing here is vastly different:
 - .. It is a <u>community-wide</u> assessment of collective State, DOD and CIA reporting from the post that will be the foreruner

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of a results-producing system for overseeing the performance of all human source reporting resources at the posts.

- Once this beginning step is well underway, several more phases will be required in order to further unify the human source collection effort.
 - These include:
 - .. development of a similar systematic approach for maintaining an overview of the responsiveness of the total community human source effort against the deniedarea hard targets, primarily the USSR and the PRC:
 - .. development of a program for integration of these collection assets now controlled by the services and militaty commands into the overall community human source collection guidance system.

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- This systematic approach to intensifying the national focus of the human source collection effort is not an "instant cure" for the many problems caused by the autonomy of various parts of the human source collection effort which your report noted.
 - of a national effort, it will also treat many of your specific recommendations such as those concerning the inadequacies in the State and Defense guidance and requirements mechanisms; the tailoring of intelligence taskings of Defense Attaches; the identification of DOD collection units essential for support to commands; refinement of economic requirements for clandestine collection; and, last but not least, a revitalization of State and Defense awareness of their respective responsibilities under NSCID 2.

Resources devoted to HUMINT

a breakdown of money ar	nd manpower over a three-
ear spread by organization,	by overt and covert
categories, to be provided b	y MPRRD. Should be
ready tomorrow.	has action. Needs
considerable work following	review of
first draft, and IRAC compet	ed.

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

June 29, 1974

Dear Bill:

I want to commend you and your associates for the initiative you have shown in adopting new management directions for the Central Intelligence Agency. The steps described in your Agency's Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1973 and subsequent developments support my directives of November 1971 and my expectation that you can produce better intelligence at less cost.

I realize that you face problems and budgetary pressures, but you have started on the right path. I want to encourage you to continue to make the CIA more responsive, to improve its product, and to insure that resources are applied to priority needs. I also support your efforts to extend these same goals to the rest of the intelligence community.

Sincerely

Honorable William E. Colby Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D. C. 20505

Extract from MOR on DCI's Meeting with PFIAB of 7 June 1974

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"5. The DCI suggested the Committee defer a report on the HUMINT question until next meeting. DCI, on inquiry, did report that he had had a conversation with the Director, FBI, and that matters were running smoothly in that quarter. The Chairman registered satisfaction and noted this was his understanding as well. As a parting comment, however, the DCI noted that he still had a number of issues with the Department of State which he hoped to address with the Secretary at an early date and on which he could report later to the Board if desired."

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

18 July 1974

Interim Report on FY 1974 Objectives for the Intelligence Community*

- 1. The five objectives for the Intelligence Community, as approved by the President on 23 September 1973, were based on the Presidential memorandum of 5 November 1971 on "Organization and Management of the Intelligence Community," and were supported by 24 identified tasks and eight sub-tasks.
- 2. The following are highlights of actions keyed to the five objectives.

Assure authoritative and responsible leadership for the Community as a whole.

- -- Providing this leadership has been my principal focus throughout the year and is reflected in responses to the other objectives. A determined effort has been made to establish substantive intelligence needs of the US Government as the driving force for work of the Intelligence Community.
- -- Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) were promulgated, in coordination with members of the National Security: Council Intelligence Committee, as guidance for near-term collection and production activity on matters of high current interest. New KIQs are being formulated for FY 1975.
- -- "The DCI's Perspective of the Intelligence Environment" was disseminated in August 1973 throughout the Community as guidance. The document described trends in the world situation expected to have an impact on intelligence tasks and identified the primary intelligence problems to which attention needed to be directed. A new "Perspective" paper for 1975-1980 is being drafted.

^{*} The annual report to the President by the Director of Central Intelligence, to be submitted in October, will provide a fuller treatment of the Intelligence Community response to the FY 1974 objectives.

Review responsiveness of US foreign intelligence activities to hattonal requirements and improve the quality, scope and timeliness of the Community's product.

- -- New product forms were introduced, including a National Intelligence Daily for about 50 NSC and Cabinet-level readers and a National Intelligence Bulletin, replacing the former Central Intelligence Bulletin. The NIB is expected to provide participating organizations greater opportunity to indicate differing or dissenting views.
- -- A program to identify and correct deficiencies in analysis and collection was initiated, one feature of which was the post-mortem on Community performance in the October 1973 Middle East crisis.
- -- A KIQ Evaluation Program (KEP) was initiated to measure Community progress in satisfying a selected number of KIQs.

Achieve a more efficient use of resources by the Community in the collection of intelligence information.

- -- The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC), assisted by the Intelligence Community Staff, reviewed the 1975 budgets and programs of all national intelligence organizations. The conclusions were continued in the National Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations for FY 1975 submitted to the President. I appeared before four congressional committees in defense of these recommendations.
- -- A system of quarterly reviews of resource utilization by all intelligence entities was undertaken by the IRAC.
- -- The IRAC Working Group initiated studies of a series of important specific program issues involving significant amounts of resources. Some of these issues and others requiring resolution this year will be highlighted during the FY 1975 program presentations to the IRAC.
- -- An Intelligence Research and Development Council was established under the IRAC. One task was to review all R&D activities within the National Foreign Intelligence Program and recommend opportunity areas which hold

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promise for eliminating identified gaps. The Council
is to propose a follow-on program of activities which
will promote a coordinated and shared RDT&E program
intended to assure a minimum of overlap or duplication
and a maximum of cross-program technology application.

Review and revise intelligence functions within the Community to improve performance.

- -- The Board of National Estimates was abolished and 12 National Intelligence Officers were appointed as my personal representatives to improve the responsiveness of the Community to intelligence needs of policymakers.
- -- A study of the interface between national and tactical intelligence activities was undertaken jointly by representatives of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.
- -- A National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Net, a secure voice conferencing system for improved reporting of indications and warning information, was developed, tested and put into operation.
- -- 'A Human Sources Committee was established as a permanent element of the United States Intelligence Board structure.

Ensure intelligence is provided to enhance formulation of US foreign, military and economic policies and to support the readiness of US military forces.

- -- Both the National Intelligence Officer program and the use of Key Intelligence Questions as guidance for collection and production on matters of high current interest contributed to this objective.
- -- New emphasis was put on improving and expanding production of foreign economic intelligence, and on improving US knowledge of the strategic capabilities of the USSR and PRC.

Approved For Release 2004/03/23 tiGla-RDR 2004/080240009001900034 actives included both tasks which could be completely accomplished within the year and projects which will require attention over a continuing period. Overall, I consider that satisfactory accomplishment or progress was achieved in more than three-fourths of the tasks. In two instances, tasks were quite clearly redundant and were eliminated, and progress was slower on a few tasks than I had anticipated. As a case in point, in response to the President's charge that tactical intelligence be included in the National Foreign Intelligence Budget. Recommendations, one of the major FY 1974 tasks was to be completion of a joint Secretary of Defense-DCI study of the national/tactical intelligence interface. Work is well underway, but still far from completion, and in retrospect the original schedule for accomplishment of what is clearly a very complicated task was unrealistic.

4. From the DCI level, much of the management-by-objective process is necessarily permissive rather than directive since the DCI has no authority to direct accomplishment of tasks by organizations within the federal departments. The identification of objectives and of tasks related to movement toward those goals served a useful purpose, however, and was supported by a high level of cooperation throughout the Community. The FY 1975 effort, for which objectives already have been developed and milestones established, will benefit from the FY 1974 experience.

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby

Memorandum for Holders USIB/IRAC-D-22, 1/17 19 June 1974

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB/IRAC-D-22.1/17

SUBJECT

: Objectives for the Intelligence Community

for FY 1975

REFERENCES

: a. USIB/IRAC-D-22.1/17, 11 June 1974

b. USIB-M-670, 13 June 1974, Item 5

The attached letter to the President from the Director of Central Intelligence forwards the final version of the subject Objectives.

This version incorporates the changes discussed at the 13 June USIB meeting (reference b.).

Executive Secretary

Attachment

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Exampt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11:52 exemption category 53(55,(2),(6) Automatically declassified on Data Impossible to Determine

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Automatically declassified

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Memorandum for Holders

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

18 June 1974

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your most encouraging letter of March 22, 1974, and its reinforcement of your earlier directives that I assume leadership of the Intelligence Community. Since taking the oath in your presence last September 4th to fulfill these duties, I am pleased to report a general spirit of cooperation and collaboration among the different elements of the Intelligence Community. The committee structures established in your November 5, 1971, directive (National Security Council Intelligence Committee, Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, and the reconstituted United States Intelligence Board) have been useful vehicles for the determination of substantive and resource questions affecting the Intelligence Community.

During Fiscal Year 1974 we have been implementing the Objectives approved in your letter of September 25, 1973. I hope the annual report on these Objectives, to be filed after the end of the fiscal year, will be satisfying to you. A number of steps have been taken which in my view improve the responsiveness of the Intelligence Community to your needs, those of the National Security Council, and those of the Congress. Specific steps of an organizational and procedural character have also been taken to focus the Intelligence Community on higher priority needs and to increase the effectiveness of our collection and analytical operations.

A fundamental element of my attempt to respond to your longterm goals of November 5, 1971, is the effort to establish

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substantive intelligence needs as the driving force for the Intelligence Community. Organization, evaluation and resource allocation should seek the satisfaction of such intelligence requirements. I am pleased to report a general acceptance of a new venture in this area, the identification of Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1974, which your September 25th letter encouraged me to produce. This guidance for what the Intelligence Community should cover will be used as the base point for the evaluation of our effectiveness at the end of the fiscal year. We are still working out the details to implement this process fully, but I intend to ensure that the substantive intelligence needs of our customers dominate discussions and decisions about the Intelligence Community.

Carrying on the process described above, and still responsive to your November 5, 1971, long-term goals, I submit herewith for your approval the Objectives of the Intelligence Community for Fiscal Year 1975. The first group of these I have termed "Substantive Objectives," describing the output I believe you would expect of the Intelligence Community during Fiscal Year 1975. These Substantive Objectives would be used as the base for the development of more detailed Key Intelligence Questions which I would issue to the Intelligence Community with the approval of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee. A second set is named "Resource Management Objectives, "dealing with the interaction of the members of the Intelligence Community and the allocation of resources to and among them. These Objectives will be reflected in my December submission to you of recommendations for the national foreign intelligence program, including tactical intelligence. Milestones have been established for the measurement and evaluation of progress toward satisfaction of these two sets of Objectives, and they will become the basis for my annual report to you of how effectively the Intelligence Community performs during Fiscal Year 1975. A copy of the Milestones has been provided to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

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I would welcome your approval, modification or discussion in the National Security Council Intelligence Committee of these recommended Objectives for 1975.

Respectfully and sincerely,

(signed)

W. E. Colby

Enclosure
Objectives for FY 1975

SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES

- l. Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive assessments of Soviet policies and intentions in the political, security and economic fields, to include the dynamics of and factors affecting Soviet leadership and decision making.
- 2. Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments of current and future Soviet military and political capabilities to exert influence or power outside the USSR, especially with respect to the United States, its forces and its allies, and other key areas such as the Middle East and China. In particular, monitor Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction, and similar negotiations.
- 3. Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments of Chinese internal and external policies and capabilities with respect to the United States, its allies, the USSR, Southeast Asia, and the Third World.
- 4. Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments on political and security situations or crises significantly affecting US interests or requiring US action (e.g., Arab-Israeli relations, South and Southeast Asia, the European Community, Latin America).
- 5. Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments relevant to US international economic policy decisions and negotiations.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

- l. Evaluate the performance of the Intelligence Community in meeting the substantive objectives contained in selective FY 1974 Key Intelligence Questions, and report the conclusions to the National Security Council Intelligence Committee for review and comment. Present Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1975 to the NSCIC for approval.
- 2. Review the programs of the Intelligence Community in the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee and submit to the President, through the Office of Management and Budget, recommendations for a consolidated intelligence program budget, including tactical intelligence. Support the President's Intelligence Budget before the Congress.
- 3. Provide leadership and guidance to the Intelligence Community, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board, with respect to:
 - a. The production of national intelligence responsive to Key Intelligence Questions developed with principal consumers and approved by the National Sectrity Council Intelligence Committee to fulfill Presidentially-approved Substantive Objectives;
 - b. Formal and informal collaboration of the individual agencies and staffs of the Intelligence Community, to ensure the priority requirements of policymaking officials are clearly understood and reflected in resource allocations and that timeliness, objectivity and clarity of intelligence products are achieved without unnecessary duplication;
 - c. The interaction of national and tactical intelligence to contribute both to national intelligence and to force readiness;
 - d. The proper integration of all intelligence to produce the best possible results;
 - e. The protection of intelligence sources and methods; and

- f. Longer-term projection for planning of intelligence needs in the years ahead.
- 4. Stimulate research, development and application of techniques and procedures to improve intelligence collection, processing, analysis, production and presentation, with particular attention to product improvements and cost savings.

MILESTONES

FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES IN THE DCI'S

OBJECTIVES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975

Classified by DCI Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category 5B(2). Automatically declassified on: date impossible to determine

SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVE NO. 1

Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive assessments of Soviet policies and intentions in the political, security and economic fields to include the dynamics of and factors affecting Soviet leadership and decision making.

OBJECTIVE NO. 2

Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments of current and future Soviet military and political capabilities to exert influence or power outside the USSR, especially with respect to the United States, its forces and its allies, and other key areas such as the Middle East and China. In particular, monitor Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) and similar negotiations.

OBJECTIVE NO. 3

Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments of Chinese internal and external policies and capabilities with respect to the United States, its allies, the USSR, Southeast Asia, and the Third World.

OBJECTIVE NO. 4

Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments on political and security situations or crises significantly affecting US interests or requiring US action (e.g., Arab-Israeli relations, South and Southeast Asia, the European Community, Latin America).

OBJECTIVE NO. 5

Provide reliable, timely and comprehensive information and assessments relevant to US international economic policy decisions and negotiations.

SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES

MILESTONES

31 July 1974 FY 75 Key Intelligence Questions

related to these objectives established: Key Intelligence Questions Evaluation Process (KEP) II initiated.

1 September 1974 Baseline Reports on FY 75 KIQs

completed, including the most important information deficiencies,

and the commitment of Program Managers to collect and produce against the deficiencies and the

KIQs.

1 October 1974 Performance Reports on FY 74 KIQs*

(KEP I-pilot run of 11 KIQs) completed.

including assessment of intelligence gain, relative contributions of

different collectors and associated

costs.

l November 1974 Evaluation Report on Community

Performance in KEP I completed providing both substantive and resource judgments of performance

against all KIQs in KEP I.

*FY 75 Objectives addressed by selected KIQs in KEP I

FY 75 Obj. KEP I KIQs No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5

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SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES

MILESTONES (continued)

1 July 1975

Issue FY 76 Key Intelligence Questions; initiate KEP III.

1 September 1975

Performance Reports on FY 75 KIQs for the period 1 July 1974 - 30June 1975 completed (about 50 questions), including assessment of intelligence gain, relative contribution of different collectors and

associated costs.

1 October 1975

Evaluation Report on Community performance in KEP II completed providing both substantive and resource judgments of performance

against all KIQs in KEP II.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVE NO. 1

Evaluate the performance of the Intelligence Community in meeting the substantive objectives contained in selective FY 1974 Key Intelligence Questions, and report the conclusions to the National Security Council Intelligence Committee for review and comment. Present Key Intelligence Questions for FY 75 to the NSCIC for approval.

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Consideration of Key Intelligence Questions for FY 75 at a meeting of the NSCIC.

1 November 1974

Evaluation Report on Community Performance in KEP I completed providing both substantive and resource judgments of performance against all KIQs in KEP I.

1 December 1974

DCI includes appropriate performance assessment data in the National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations to the President.

OBJECTIVE NO. 2

Review the programs of the Intelligence Community in the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee and submit to the President, through the Office of Management and Budget, recommendations for a consolidated intelligence program budget, including tactical intelligence. Support the President's intelligence budget before the Congress.

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OBJECTIVE NO. 2 (continued)

	OTIVE NO. 2 (CONCINU	ea)
	MILESTONES	
	1 July 1974	Office of Management and Budget issues planning ceiling.
	3-15 July 1974	DCI reviews APS, CCP SRV, GDIP, State INR CIAP with Program Managers.
	18-19 July 1974	
	22 July 1974	IRAC meeting; FY 76 programs presented.
4	24-28 July 1974	DCI confers with Secretary of Defense.
	29 July 1974	Defense Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) issued - ASD(I) with IC Staff participation.
	August 1974	Presentation of National Intelligence Program issues and resource considera- tions at a meeting of the NSCIC.
	15 August 1974	Begin preparation of separate Agency Budgets.
	1 September 1974	Commence preparation of NFIPR.
	15 November 1974	DCI review draft NFIPR.
	22 November 1974	Distribute draft NFIPR.
	27 November 1974	IRAC meeting to review NFIPR.
	5 December 1974	Submission of NFIPR to the President.

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OBJECTIVE NO. 3

Provide leadership and guidance to the Intelligence Community, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board, to include:

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OBJECTIVE NO. 3 (continued)

Long-Term Planning Guidance

MILESTONE

1 August 1974

Produce and disseminate the DCI's Perspectives for Intelligence Planning 1975-1980.

Production of National Intelligence

MILESTONES

1 July 1974

Complete the test period for the National Intelligence Bulletin, a daily publication; begin regular publication.

1 October 1974

Obtain USIB approval to begin three-month test of the National Intelligence Situation Summary, a publication for crisis periods.

1 November 1974

Complete comprehensive inventory of serial publications issued by the Community and identify what duplication or gaps exist.

1 January 1975

Complete the test period for the National Intelligence Situation Summary; begin regular publication.

National SIGINT Plan

MILESTONES

1 August 1974

Completion by the Director, NSA, of the initial draft of an integrated long-term national SIGINT Plan which will balance all current and projected requirements and priorities with postulated constraints, address all SIGINT capabilities and direct support resources, and consider processing and presentation as well as collection activities.

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OBJECTIVE NO. 3

National SIGINT Plan

MILESTONES (continued)

October 1974

Completion by the NIO for Economics of a review of economic requirements provided to the National Security Agency; seek a prioritization of these tasks.

1 November 1974

Presentation of the SIGINT Plan to USIB/IRAC prior to submission to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

National Imagery Intelligence Plan

MILESTONES

1 July 1974

Complete the Imaging Systems Mix Study (ISMS) which will serve as the data base for the July and November 1974 ExCom decisions which will influence the direction of the national reconnaissance effort during the next five years.

1 October 1974

Develop terms of reference for preparation, under ExCom auspices, of a National Imagery Intelligence Plan applicable to all intelligence imagery systems currently available or which could become available within the next five years.

November 1974

Presentation of National Imagery Intelligence Plan terms of reference to ExCom and USIB.

1 July 1975

Complete interim report on the plan for presentation at the July 1975 ExCom meeting.

November 1975

Presentation of completed plan to ExCom and USIB.

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OBJECTIVE NO. 3 (continued)

Human Source Requirements

MILESTONES

1 July 1974

Reconstitute the USIB Human Sources Committee on a permanent basis, with broad responsibilities to review and make recommendations concerning human source collection programs.

1 October 1974

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1 January 1975

Complete a review of the adequacy of substantive communication between human source collectors and production analysts and, as appropriate, develop mechanisms to improve such communication.

Foreign Economic Intelligence Guidance

MILESTONES

l November 1974

Reactivate the Requirements Advisory Board (RAB) before this date.

1 December 1974

Evaluation by the NIO for Economics and the EIC of responses to collection guidance transmitted via the Combined Economic Reporting Program (CERP).

Crisis and Warning Intelligence

MILESTONES

1 August 1974

Complete studies of the use of SIGINT and imagery intelligence during crises and submit recommendations for improvement to the USIB.

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OBJECTIVE NO. 3

Crisis and Warning Intelligence

MILESTONES (continued)

1 November 1974

Complete review of the initial phase of activity under the USIB-approved National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Net (NOIWON); initiate such improvements as are appropriate.

1 January 1975

Complete USIB action on a reorganization of the Watch Committee and the National Indications Center, and on recommendations to enhance the Community's ability to issue clear and timely warnings.

National/Tactical Intelligence Interface

MILESTONES

1 July 1974

Working in concert with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish: (1) a joint national/tactical intelligence requirements task group to identify the peacetime, contingency and wartime essential elements of information of a representative military field commander; (2) a national intelligence capabilities task group to determine and quantify the capabilities of national intelligence systems to satisfy the intelligence needs of military commanders; (3) a joint task group to design and establish a common data base to incorporate identified tactical and national intelligence resources and to support the two substantive task groups.

OBJECTIVE NO. 3

National/Tactical Intelligence Interface

MILESTONES (continued)

1 September 1974 Initiate combined functioning of the requirements task group and the capabilities working group.

1 October 1974

Complete statement of the representative military commander's intelligence requirements and the national intelligence capabilities to respond to those requirements. Utilizing lessons learned in representative command test effort, initiate requirements/capabilities study of

remaining areas.

1 February 1975 Initiate combined functioning of the requirements and capabilities working groups.

Formulate recommendations in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense to enhance assurance that the needs of national intelligence and of military operations are met without unnecessary duplication.

Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods

MILESTONES

Presentation and defense before Congress of recommendations for legislation to strengthen the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

OBJECTIVE NO. 3

Production of Intelligence Sources and Methods

MILESTONES (continued)

NOTE: Such legislation already has been drafted. Specific milestone dates will depend upon action regarding this proposed legislation by the Executive Branch and the Congress.

l January 1975

Have in operational use the initial elements of a Community Limited Access Intelligence Register (CLAIRE) as an unclassified automated system handling authorization lists for sensitive intelligence projects or topics.

OBJECTIVE NO. 4

Stimulate research, development and application of techniques and procedures to improve intelligence collection, processing, analysis, production and presentation, with particular attention to product improvements and cost savings.

MILESTONES

1 November 1974

Obtain from the IRAC R&D Council formal recommendations for intelligence R&D efforts responsive to issues described in the DCI's Perspectives 1975-1980.

1 December 1974

Develop selective studies to determine how new information handling and presentation processes might enforce analytic methods and also impact on the value of information to policy makers.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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13 MAR 1974

Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.) Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board The White House Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear George:

Your letter of 27 February is much appreciated.

I fully agree with your view that the tactical intelligence capabilities of the Navy need to be sustained, and I only wish it were possible for me to include a visit to the Naval forces in the Mediterranean during my March trip to Europe. As you can understand, my trip already has been planned on a very tight schedule. I am, however, arranging for Lieutenant General Graham, my Deputy for the Intelligence Community, to visit Rota as part of a trip he will be making in late March. I will try later to make specific visits to the U&S Commanders, including USCINCEUR, to allow more detailed observation of the intelligence needs of the military forces in the field.

The national/tactical intelligence interface study is moving along, but it is far from completion. I appreciate your offer of pertinent parts of the Board's Navy study for use in this effort.

I recognize the basis for your concern with respect to coverage of the NRP in an omnibus NSCID, but I can assure you we are not going to tinker with a program which is operating well. There is no intention to consider NRO activities as just another intelligence system.

The omnibus NSCID project is still in the rough draft stage. The initial effort is exploring whether all of the existing NSCIDs could be consolidated in a single NSCID at the Secret level. From

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this effort. I hope we can identify some aspects of the present NSCID and DCID structure which might be improved. We will certainly be in touch with you before any draft hardens into final form and, as usual, would be most appreciative of your views.

Sincerely.

/s/ Bill

N. E. Colby

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	THE WHITE HOUSE	

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

WASHINGTON

February 27, 1974

Dear Bill:

In reviewing the minutes of your presentation at the February 7 Board meeting, two items which you raised stimulated discussion then or subsequently on matters of deep and longstanding concern to the Board that I believe worthwhile bringing to your current attention. They are:

- (1) management of the National Reconnaissance Program; and
- (2) strategic-tactical intelligence interface.

The Board is most enthusiastic about your present effort to examine the original directives governing the management of the NRP, and reiterates its offer to assist you in this process. With regard to constructing a National Security Council Intelligence Directive to, among other things, replace the Vance/Raborn agreement of 1965, the Board would be reluctant to support an "omnibus" NSCID if the NRP would thereby be treated as any other intelligence system. We believe the magnificent achievements and management efficiencies obtained to date are in great measure a reflection of the special treatment accorded this most valuable national asset.

As regards the subject of strategic-tactical intelligence interface, the Board strongly endorses your intent to address this matter in the comprehensive manner it deserves. You may be assured of our support in this endeavor as well. In this connection, we believe there are certain parts of the Board's Navy study, conducted in response to the President's charge at our October 4, 1973 meeting with him, which you may find of some utility. As soon as it is possible to do so, I will send you a copy for review. In the meantime, however, let me note that, based on our observations worldwide, we conclude that the U. S. Navy now has an advantage over the Soviet Navy in the tactical exploitation of communications intelligence.

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The technical support necessary to sustain this requires some assistance from the Washington community, but the finished product is generated on-the-scene and reflects the essential relationship between intelligence and operations.

If you are able to keep your scheduled European trip, might I suggest that, if it is at all possible, you include a day or perhaps two in the Mediterranean area with our Naval forces. Based on Members' reactions, I believe you too would find it exceptionally beneficial, particularly as regards the ability and limitations of tactical forces to satisfy their own intelligence requirements and their level of dependence on national authorities. I am confident the Navy would welcome the opportunity to host you.

Sincerely,

George W. Anderson, Jr.

Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Chairman

Honorable William E. Colby Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D. C.

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